Téléchargez le livre :  Epistemic Value

Epistemic Value

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OUP Oxford

Paru le : 2009-09-03

Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values ente...
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Parution
2009-09-03

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EAN papier
9780191571121

Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008). Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.

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9780191571121
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58,77 €
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2202 Ko

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