Description du livre
This
book traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and
the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the most
infamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broader
lessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligence
in strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationship
between intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also a
historical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the Joint
Intelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time.
Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, Danny
Steed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain that
has so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Through
extensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination of
often referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this study
identifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealed
by the Suez Crisis.